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This article explores economic and legal issues in the WTO dispute China – Broiler Products (Article 
21.5 – United States) (DS427). In 2011, the US initiated a dispute against the conduct and results of 
China’s 2009 trade remedy investigation into US broiler products (chickens). The Panel Report found 
that China had acted inconsistently with its WTO obligations. On the basis of a redetermination, China 
continued to impose duties and the United States initiated WTO compliance proceedings. The 
compliance Panel Report, circulated in 2018, concluded that China had failed to comply with its WTO 
obligations when allocating costs to construct US domestic prices for broiler products. However, China 
was found to have acted consistently with its WTO obligations with respect to two claims which raise 
some interesting legal questions. Ultimately, after almost a decade of litigation, China removed the 
antidumping and countervailing duties on US broiler products in 2018.  
Keywords 





In September 2009, United States President Barack Obama announced a safeguards tariff increase on 
tires from China – which at the time were valued at $2.1 billion annually – because imports were causing 
market disruption for domestic producers. Days after the US announcement, China started its 
antidumping and countervailing investigation on US broiler products and, in 2010, imposed increased 
duties on those products. The suspicious timing hinted that China’s motive was retaliation against US 
policy rather than a concern with its own domestic producers. 1 Moreover, with Chinese imports of 
American chicken valued at $800 million annually, the policy action by China appeared to be an effort 
at a carefully calibrated retaliation against the US tire safeguard.  
The US tariff against Chinese tires reduced tire imports from China.2 However, China's tariff on US 
broiler products was even more effective. In 2009, the United States exported over 613,000 metric tons 
of broiler meat to China. Exports fell almost 90% after the imposition of the duties. Before the tariff, 
US broiler chickens were the third-most valuable agriculture-related commodity exported to China; after 
the tariff, they fell to thirteenth. While China only accounted for 18% of total US chicken exports in 
2009, the Chinese market was crucial for US producers. About half of the chicken exported to China 
was in the form of chicken feet, which had a near-zero value for US consumers, but was considered a 
delicacy in China. Selling chicken feet to China had been an important source of profit for the US 
industry.  
In September 2011, the United States initiated a WTO dispute against the conduct and results of 
China's Ministry of Commerce's (MOFCOM) antidumping and countervailing duty investigations on 
US broiler products. In August 2013, the WTO Panel issued its report finding in favour of the United 
States on nearly all US claims. However, China did not comply with the rulings and the United States 
brought a compliance proceeding before the original panel, pursuant to Article 21.5 of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU). In January 2018, the compliance panel found favour of the United 
States on almost all the claims. Reportedly, in February 2018, MOFCOM announced the removal of the 
antidumping and countervailing duties imposed on US broiler products.3 This was a success for the 
United States, which has not always been able to secure China's compliance. For instance, despite the 
US victory in the China – Electronic Payment Services dispute, China still blocks major US suppliers, 
such as Visa and MasterCard, from its market.4  
This article explores certain issues that arose in the WTO dispute China – Broiler Products (Article 
21.5 – United States) (DS427) from both a legal and an economic perspective. In the following pages, 
we provide a brief summary of the dispute at issue (section 2); our analysis of those particular aspects 
of the dispute that we have considered more interesting from a legal and economic perspective (section 
3); and our conclusions (section 4).  
                                                     
1 "What Can We Learn about U.S.-China Trade Disputes from China's Past Trade Retaliations" by Minghao Li, Wendong 
Zhang, and Chad Hart; Centre for Agricultural and Rural Development, March 2018. 
https://www.card.iastate.edu/products/publications/pdf/18pb22.pdf 
2 Interestingly, Chung, et. al. (2016) find that the discriminatory US tire safeguard against China was not effective at reducing 
overall imports or stabilizing US domestic employment.  
3 "China drops U.S. broiler chicken import duties amid growing trade tensions", 27 February 2018. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-chickens/china-drops-u-s-broiler-chicken-import-duties-amid-growing-
trade-tensions-idUSKCN1GB0BD 
4 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance, February 2019, page 8. 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2018-USTR-Report-to-Congress-on-China%27s-WTO-Compliance.pdf 
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2. Summary of the dispute 
The original Panel Report in China – Broiler Products was circulated on 2 August 2013. There was no 
appeal, so the DSB adopted the report on 25 September 2013. In accordance with the sequencing 
agreement signed between China and the United States on 15 July 20145, the United States requested 
the establishment of a panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU after consultations had failed to resolve 
the parties' disagreement as to whether China had complied with its WTO obligations. The compliance 
Panel Report in China – Broiler Products (Article 21.5 – United States) was circulated on 18 January 
2018. As neither of the parties appealed it, the report was adopted by the DSB on 28 February 2018.  
The compliance Panel addressed nine claims brought by the United States. China was found to have 
complied with its WTO obligations with respect to only two of those claims. In particular, the 
compliance Panel found that China did not act inconsistently with Articles 6.9 and 9.4(i) of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement by failing to disclose data and calculations underlying the dumping margins for 
Pilgrim's Pride and Keystone and by determining a "residual" rate based on facts available to be applied 
to unknown "exporters"6, respectively. 
For the other seven claims, the Panel found that China had failed to comply with both procedural and 
substantive obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement. Regarding 
"procedural" obligations, China failed to "give notice" to US interested parties of the information it 
required of Chinese producers during the reinvestigation and also failed to provide "timely 
opportunities" for the US interested parties to see the requests for information issued to the Chinese 
producers. As per the "substantive" obligations, China acted inconsistently with its WTO obligations 
when determining the existence of dumping (erring in its construction of normal value under Article 
2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement), when determining injury to the domestic industry (erring in 
its assessment of price effects and consequent impact on domestic producers) and when establishing the 
causal link between the alleged unfair trade practice and the said injury (relying on its defective 
consideration of price effects). 
We note that, pursuant to the sequencing agreement signed by the parties to the dispute, the United 
States reserved the right to request authorization to retaliate, in the event that an Article 21.5 compliance 
proceeding ruled that China had failed to comply with its WTO obligations. The United States did not 
request authorization to suspend concessions against China pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU, which 
seems to prove that MOFCOM effectively removed the antidumping and countervailing duties as it 
announced in February 2018.  
3. Analysis of particular aspects 
In this paper, we focus attention on three claims brought by the United States: the claim regarding 
MOFCOM's disclosure of "essential facts" (Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement); the claim 
concerning MOFCOM's application of a "residual" rate to unknown exporters (Article 9.4(i) of the 
Agreement); and the claim regarding MOFCOM's allocation of costs when constructing the normal 
value (Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement). We have decided to address these issues for 
essentially two reasons.  
First, despite China's overall failure to comply with its WTO obligations, the compliance Panel found 
that China had acted consistently with Articles 6.9 and 9.4(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement regarding 
essential facts and residual rates. Therefore, in these two specific instances, MOFCOM's conduct serves 
as an example of what may be considered compatible with these specific obligations of the Anti-
                                                     
5 Understanding between China and the United States regarding procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU, 
WT/DS427/9, 18 July 2014. 
6 Panel Report, paras. 7.417 and 7.438. 
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Dumping Agreement. From a systemic point of view, and thinking about possible future disputes, we 
find it is useful – at least from a legal perspective – to examine what conducts of an investigating 
authority reach the level of compliance with WTO obligations. 
Second, among all the obligations with which China failed to comply, the obligation contained in 
Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement led, in our view, to the most appealing discussion in the 
compliance Panel Report. Whereas most of the other aspects addressed by the compliance Panel had 
already been discussed in previous cases, the cost allocation problem in this dispute raised some 
interesting issues.  
From the perspective of economic analysis, this dispute highlights three substantive issues. The first 
issue relates to the narrow problem of how to interpret and properly implement the obligations of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement with regard to cost-allocation in a dumping case. The other two lie outside 
the scope of what the Panel examined, but relate to an important economic question of the institutional 
design of the WTO agreements. These are both normative problems – what rights and obligations should 
the WTO agreements allow or impose with regard to in a situation like that in Broiler Products? Given 
that there was essentially no anti-competitive behaviour by US exporters, but the Chinese government 
had a clear interest in reducing the competitive pressure facing its domestic chicken producers, what 
freedoms to adjust trade policy should be allowed under the WTO? Finally, given that the case was 
initially filed in 2013 and was determined to be WTO-inconsistent policy in 2018, is it appropriate that 
the WTO agreements do not allow for redress or damages for the loss of a member’s market access?  
We proceed by first discussing “what China got right,” then discussing the law and economics of 
cost allocation, and finally offering some comments on the normative economics questions raised by 
this dispute.  
3.1 "What China got right": Essential Facts and Residual Rate 
3.1.1 Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement: Essential facts 
In the original proceedings, the United States claimed that China failed to comply with the obligation in 
Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to disclose the essential facts forming the basis of 
MOFCOM's decision to apply anti-dumping duties "by failing to make available the data and 
calculations it performed to determine the existence and margin of dumping, including the calculation 
of the normal value and export price for the three respondents". After examining MOFCOM's disclosure 
in relation to each individual respondent, the original Panel considered that "[w]ithout the information 
as to what sales prices" and "formulas" were being used to calculate normal value, export price, and the 
weighted-average dumping margins, the respondents would be unable to ascertain the accuracy of 
MOFCOM's calculations and to defend their interests. The Panel thus concluded that China acted 
inconsistently with Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 7 
In the compliance proceedings, the United States again claimed that China acted inconsistently with 
Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement during the reinvestigation by failing to disclose the essential 
facts underlying the determination of the dumping margin in respect of Pilgrim's Pride and Keystone. 
In particular, with respect to Pilgrim's Pride (cooperating exporter), the United States argued that 
MOFCOM failed to disclose the data and margin calculations from the original investigation. With 
respect to Keystone (non-cooperating exporter), the United States asserted that MOFCOM failed to 
disclose the data and margin calculations from both the original investigation and the reinvestigation.8 
                                                     
7 Original Panel Report, paras. 7.66, 7.100, 7.104, 7.106 and 7.107. 
8 Compliance Panel Report, para. 7.362. 
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The compliance Panel noted that Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that "the 
authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested parties of the essential facts 
under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures". Such 
disclosure must take place in sufficient time for the parties to defend their interests. 
The Panel then recalled the legal standard for Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It noted 
that the requirement to "inform" is an "active" disclosure obligation, although the investigating authority 
has a "large margin of discretion" as to the format or how all interested parties are to be informed.9 
Regarding what must be disclosed, the "essential facts under consideration" are "those facts on the record 
that may be taken into account by an authority in reaching a decision as to whether or not to apply 
definitive anti-dumping … duties". For facts to "form the basis" of this decision, they must be 
"significant in the process of reaching this decision, whether it is because they are salient for a decision 
to apply definitive measures or salient for a contrary outcome".10 The compliance Panel recalled its 
original finding that Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires the disclosure of the following 
essential facts in respect of the dumping determination for the cooperating exporters: (i) the data 
underlying the determination that form the basis for the calculation of the dumping margin, including 
any adjustments; (ii) the comparisons of home market and export sales; and (iii) the formulae applied 
for these comparisons. For the unknown and non-cooperating exporters to whom facts available are 
applied, the following essential facts should be disclosed: (i) the precise basis for the decision to resort 
to facts available, such as the failure by an interested party to provide the information that was requested; 
(ii) the information that was requested from an interested party; and (iii) the facts that were used to 
replace the missing information.11  
Notably, the compliance Panel highlighted its previous finding in the original proceedings that "the 
calculations themselves (including any files or spreadsheets created during the calculations)" that are 
made to determine the dumping margin are not essential facts that must be disclosed. Despite this finding 
in the original report, the United States insisted, at the compliance stage, that MOFCOM should have 
made available the precise mathematical calculations that it performed or conducted.12 The United States 
argued that the requirement to disclose margin calculations was endorsed by the Appellate Body in 
China – HP-SST (Japan)(EU) when noting that "an investigating authority is expected … to disclose, 
inter alia, … the calculation methodology applied by [it] to determine the margin of dumping". The 
compliance Panel observed, however, that a margin calculation methodology is different from margin 
calculations themselves and that the Appellate Body's passage was made in the context the European 
Union's argument that "the calculation methodology, such as the formulae used in calculations and the 
data applied in the formulae", must be disclosed under Article 6.9.13 In the Panel's view, this confirms 
its original finding regarding "what must be disclosed: data and formulae, but not the calculations". In 
the light of this, the Panel concluded that the United States had not established its claim under Article 
6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in respect of disclosure of "margin calculations".14 
Regarding Pilgrim's Pride, we recall that the United States claimed that MOFCOM did not provide 
the original data during the reinvestigation. The compliance Panel noted that, according to the general 
principles on allocation of the burden of proof, it was for the United States to establish that China failed 
to provide the original data to Pilgrim's Pride. Although the Panel recognized that a claim of violation 
based on an alleged omission – here the lack of disclosure – raises evidentiary challenges, it observed 
                                                     
9 Compliance Panel Report, paras. 7.369-7.370. 
10 Compliance Panel Report, para. 7.366 (quoting Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 240). 
11 Compliance Panel Report, paras. 7.367-7.368. 
12 Compliance Panel Report, paras. 7.367 and 7.374. 
13 Compliance Panel Report, para. 7.376 (quoting Appellate Body Report, China – HP-SST (Japan)(EU), para. 5.125). 
(underlining added by the Compliance Panel in China – Broiler Products) 
14 Compliance Panel Report, paras. 7.377-7.378. 
China – Broiler Products (Article 21.5 – United States) (DS427) – can the sum of the parts be less than the whole? 
European University Institute 5 
that "at a minimum it should be uncontroversial to say that the mere allegation of an omission does not 
amount to proof". In this regard, the Panel observed that, "in none of its submissions, did the United 
States refer to any evidence that could support [its] factual assertion".15 For its part, China argued that 
MOFCOM had, in fact, disclosed the original data to Pilgrim's Pride during the reinvestigation. Initially, 
it relied on Exhibit CHN-8, which contained empty tables and no reference to the original 
investigation.16 China then submitted Exhibit CHN-45 – a spreadsheet with six separate tabs of data, the 
first five of which were arguably unchanged from the original investigation – and Exhibit CHN-46 – a 
narrative to the data in Exhibit CHN-45.17 The United States did not contest that an unredacted version 
of Exhibit CHN-45 as well as Exhibit CHN-46 were disclosed to Pilgrim's Pride, but it claimed that they 
did not "allow Pilgrim's to reconstruct its original rate of 53.4 per cent" and to identify "what has changed 
since". The Panel, however, found that the United States did not demonstrate that the specific 
explanations in CHN-46 in respect of the changes to the dumping margin equation, in connection with 
the dumping margin calculation disclosed in "tab six" of Exhibit CHN-45, were insufficient to allow 
Pilgrim's Pride to understand the changes and to ascertain their accuracy. In essence, in the Panel's view, 
at no point did the United States offer any evidence to support its allegation that the original data had 
not been disclosed. Consequently, the compliance Panel found that the United States had failed to 
establish its claim under Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to Pilgrim's Pride.18 
Regarding Keystone, we recall that the United States claimed that MOFCOM did not provide the 
original and the new data during the reinvestigation. There was no disagreement between the parties that 
Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement applies to non-cooperating exporters, and thus, in the 
context of the reinvestigation, to Keystone. The issue between them was whether MOFCOM failed to 
disclose the data in question to any agent allegedly representing Keystone, and in particular Steptoe. 
According to China, MOFCOM did not receive proof of authorization and was not therefore in a position 
to disclose Keystone's confidential data to an unauthorized third party. According to the United States, 
proof of authorization was indeed provided to MOFCOM. The United States relied on a "memorandum" 
of 20 May 2014, which was a letter signed by Thomas J. Trendl at Steptoe stating that MOFCOM could 
serve Keystone's disclosure to him or Scott Lindsay at the US Embassy. The compliance Panel noted, 
however, that Keytone's authorization of Mr Trendl and/or Mr Lindsay did not accompany the 
"memorandum". In the light of this, the Panel found that it was not unreasonable for MOFCOM to 
consider that the "memorandum" of 20 May 2014 by Steptoe did not amount to authorization of agency. 
It further found that the United States had not established that Keystone provided such proof of 
authorization to MOFCOM at another time in another document. In these circumstances, the Panel 
concluded that MOFCOM did not act in a biased or unobjective manner in finding that the purported 
agents of Keystone were not authorized to receive disclosure of Keystone's confidential data at issue. 
Accordingly, it concluded that the United States had failed to establish its claim under Article 6.9 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to Keystone.19  
In essence, the compliance Panel in China – Broiler Products confirmed its original finding and 
agreed with previous panels that margin calculations themselves are not "essential facts" that must be 
disclosed pursuant to Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In China – X-Ray Equipment, the 
panel rejected the European Union's claim that MOFCOM had violated Article 6.9 by failing to disclose 
its calculations of the margins of dumping.20 Similarly, in China – Autos (US), the panel noted that the 
"details of the calculation" of a residual duty rate do not per se constitute facts falling within the scope 
                                                     
15 Compliance Panel Report, paras. 7.381 and 7.383. 
16 Compliance Panel Report, para. 7.385. 
17 Compliance Panel Report, paras. 7.386-7.387. 
18 Compliance Panel Report, paras. 7.390-7.391 and 7.393. 
19 Compliance Panel Report, paras. 7.398, 7.405, 7.408, and 7.415-7.416. 
20 Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment, paras. 7.420-7.421. 
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of the Article 6.9 disclosure obligation.21 However, despite this clear precedent, the United States seems 
to keep insisting on calculations being disclosed. One can only wonder whether the legal standard set 
forth for Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement when it comes to the disclosure of essential facts 
should allow for some flexibility in those cases where a general lack of transparency on the part of the 
investigating authority can be shown. It cannot be excluded entirely that, in a particular instance where 
actual calculations are not disclosed, the respondents may be unable to fully understand how the 
investigating authority reached its conclusions and, therefore, may be also unable to "defend their 
interests" properly.22 In the particular case at hand, one could not avoid having the impression that 
China's compliance with Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement had more to do with the United 
States' inability to discharge its burden of proof than with MOFCOM's serious intention to be as 
transparent as possible. In a sense, the issue remains open for other contexts in which it is easier for a 
complainant to provide evidence about the IA's failure to disclose essential information.  
3.1.2 Article 9.4(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement: Residual rate for unknown exporters 
In the original proceedings, there was no discussion under Article 9.4(i) of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. The original Panel made findings regarding the use of facts available under Article 6.8 and 
Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in establishing the "residual" rate.23 In the original 
investigation, MOFCOM had used facts available to establish a "residual" rate of 105.4% for US 
exporters that had not registered with MOFCOM in response to the Notice of Initiation and, as a 
consequence, were considered unknown, and also did not file a questionnaire response. The original 
Panel found that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement because it failed to sufficiently explain which facts on the record were used to calculate the 
"residual" rate.24 
In the compliance proceedings, the United States alleged that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with 
Article 9.4(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because, in the redetermination, it set the "residual" rate 
for unknown exporters in excess of the weighted average margin of dumping established with respect 
to exporters individually examined under Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In the 
redetermination, MOFCOM established the "residual" rate based on Pilgrim's Pride rate, 73.8%, the 
highest rate found for any of the examined exporters. This rate was applied to unknown exporters that 
did not register for participation in the original investigation. The United States argued that, unlike in 
the original investigation, MOFCOM did not invite any exporter to register and cooperate during the 
reinvestigation. In these circumstances, the United States noted, MOFCOM applied the 73.8% facts 
available rate to exporters who did not have any opportunity to cooperate in the reinvestigation. China 
replied that, as part of its implementation obligation, MOFCOM was not required to offer the "unknown" 
exporters a second opportunity to cooperate during the reinvestigation.25 
The compliance recalled that Article 9.4(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that when the 
authorities have limited their examination to only several exporters or producers, any anti-dumping duty 
applied to imports from exporters or producers not included in the examination shall not exceed "the 
weighted average margin of dumping established with respect to the selected exporters or producers". 
                                                     
21 Panel Report, China – Autos (US), para. 7.148. 
22 See Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 240. 
23 In both its original investigation and the reinvestigation, in addition to determining individual rates for certain exporters 
individually examined, MOFCOM established a separate "all others" rates, which applied to exporters that had registered 
following the Notice of Initiation in the original investigation, and a "residual" rate, which applied to any foreign exporter 
or producer that had not registered in the original investigation. 
24 Original Panel Report, paras. 7.276, 7.278 and 7.313. 
25 Compliance Panel Report, paras. 7.418, 7.424, 7.426 and 7.429. 
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The Panel noted that this provision regulates the maximum amount of anti-dumping duty that may 
be imposed or collected in respect of imports from exporters that were not individually examined. It 
observed, however, that Article 9.4 "does not specifically address the duty rate that may be applied to 
exporters not known to the investigating authority and which therefore are not available to be selected 
for individual examination".26  
The compliance Panel stressed that neither the Anti-Dumping Agreement nor the SCM Agreement, 
nor any other relevant WTO agreement, provides any guidance regarding how adopted 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB are to be implemented. It noted that China limited the 
reinvestigation to those matters it considered necessary to bring MOFCOM's original determination into 
conformity with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. With regard to the "residual" rate at issue, this involved 
ensuring that the manner in which MOFCOM selected the facts available was consistent with Article 
6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In the Panel's view, the fact that China issued a new 
Notice of Initiation with respect to the reinvestigation "does not necessarily mean that in the 
reinvestigation, MOFCOM was required to re-open or undertake a new process for establishing which 
exporters would be examined individually". Finally, the Panel noted that MOFCOM had originally 
limited the examination to three selected exporters and continued to do so in the reinvestigation; and 
added: "[a]s far as we are aware, no previously 'unknown' exporter sought to participate or provide 
information in the reinvestigation". In the light of this, the compliance Panel found that the United States 
did not established that MOFCOM failed to comply with Article 9.4(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
in the reinvestigation by determining a "residual" duty rate based on facts available to be applied to 
"unknown" exporters.27 
As a take away, we recall that, according to the Appellate Body, Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement "seeks to prevent the exporters, who were not asked to cooperate in the investigation, from 
being prejudiced by gaps or shortcomings in the information supplied by the investigated exporters".28 
By its own terms, however, Article 9.4 does not address the situation in which certain companies do not 
make themselves known to the investigating authority. The compliance panel in China – Broiler 
Products followed the guidance offered by the panel in EC – Salmon (Norway), which found that "the 
investigating authority's attribution of a [higher] margin of dumping to non-cooperating companies does 
not fall within the scope of Article 9.4(i), which, under Article 6.10, applies only to 'known' exporters".29 
Notably, the EC – Salmon (Norway) dispute never reached the compliance stage under Article 21.5 of 
the DSU. Conversely, in China – Broiler Products, the United States raised a claim under Article 9.4(i) 
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement only at the compliance stage. This might raise the question as to 
whether the notion of "unknown" exporters should be revisited at the compliance stage. Notably, it is 
unclear what the compliance Panel would have concluded had "a previously 'unknown' exporter sought 
to participate or provide information in the reinvestigation". On the one hand, the Panel's finding 
that China was not required to re-do the whole investigation to comply with the DSB rulings and 
recommendations, seems reasonable. Indeed, China had to bring its measures into conformity with the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement only with the respect to those aspects found to be WTO inconsistent.30 On 
the other hand, the US position does not seem entirely far-fetched, considering that, in the 
reinvestigation, "sampling" had already been done31 and MOFCOM could have just issued an invitation 
for any potential new exporters to register and become "known".  
                                                     
26 Compliance Panel Report, para. 7.432. 
27 Compliance Panel Report, paras. 7.434 and 7.437-7.438. 
28 Appellate Body Report, United States – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 123. See also Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Zeroing (Article 21.5 – EC), para. 452.  
29 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.433. 
30 Compliance Panel Report, paras.7.436-7.437. 
31 We recall that MOFCOM had originally limited the examination to three selected exporters and continued to do so in the 
reinvestigation.  
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3.2 "What China got wrong": Cost Allocation 
In the original proceedings, the United States claimed that China had acted inconsistently with the first 
and second sentences of Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because MOFCOM declined 
to use the respondents' normal records and their cost allocations in constructing normal value.32 We 
recall that the products subject to investigation were fresh, chilled or frozen broiler products (including 
whole chickens, parts or by-products), except for live, canned or cooked products.33 As background, the 
Panel observed that, in the course of the investigation, all three respondents had explained that, given 
the nature of the production of chicken products – which all have common costs up to the point of the 
split-off of the various parts from the whole chicken, such as breast meat, leg, quarters and chicken feet 
– they had used a "relative sales value" allocation methodology, by which "pre-split-off costs of 
production were allocated to the various joint products according to the proportion of revenue generated 
by the sale of those products". Conversely, in its preliminary and final anti-dumping determinations, 
MOFCOM used its own weight-based allocation methodology, whereby pre-split-off costs were 
allocated based on the weight of the various chicken products.34 
In the compliance proceedings, the issue before the Panel was whether, in its redetermination, 
MOFCOM complied with the second sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement when 
allocating costs for Tyson and Pilgrim's Pride.35 
At the outset, the compliance Panel recalled that Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
provides that "costs shall normally be calculated on the basis of records kept by the exporter or producer 
under investigation, provided that such records are in accordance with the generally accepted accounting 
principles of the exporting country and reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and 
sale of the product under consideration." Moreover, "[a]uthorities shall consider all available evidence 
on the proper allocation of costs, including that which is made available by the exporter or producer in 
the course of the investigation provided that such allocations have been historically utilized by the 
exporter or producer, in particular in relation to establishing appropriate amortization and depreciation 
periods and allowances for capital expenditures and other development costs." 
The Panel noted that the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 contains the rule for the information to be 
used in calculating cost of production, that is, the "records kept by the exporter or producer under 
investigation", except where the conditions for the application of the rule are not met. The second 
sentence relates to the methodology for allocating costs: an investigating authority must "consider all 
available evidence on the proper allocation of costs". Notably, "even if the actual data on costs as 
reported in the records are rejected under the first sentence, the allocation methodology reflected in those 
records may nonetheless result in a proper allocation of costs if applied to a different set of data".36 
The Panel then recalled that MOFCOM rejected the value-based methodology because certain 
products (like chicken feet) have value in the Chinese consumer market that they do not have in the US 
market. Instead, MOFCOM decided to use a weight-based cost allocation for the subject products. The 
Panel considered that MOFCOM's rejection of a value-based cost allocation that does not capture the 
                                                     
32 Original Panel Report, para. 7.108. 
33 Original Panel Report, footnote 8 to para. 2.2. 
34 Original Panel Report, paras. 7.114 and 7.122. 
35 With respect to Pilgrim's Pride, MOFCOM did not change the method and data used in the original investigation and thus 
China was found to have failed to comply with its implementation obligations in this regard. (Compliance Panel Report, 
paras. 7.13 and 7.74). With respect to Tyson, MOFCOM did conduct a redetermination. In this case, given the "low volume" 
of like products sold in the US domestic market, which accounted for less than 5% of Tyson's total volume of the product 
concerned (i.e. chicken feet) exported to China, MOFCOM proceeded to construct the normal value by using weighted 
average production cost, plus reasonable expenses and profit. (Compliance Panel Report, para. 7.7). 
36 Panel Report, para. 7.37. 
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value of a product model in its principal market is not "inherently biased or unreasonable".37 The 
question arose as to whether MOFCOM "consider[ed] all available evidence on the proper allocation of 
costs", as required by the second sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, when 
using a weight-based cost allocation for the subject broiler products. 
In that regard, MOFCOM decided to allocate "the necessary expenses invested by a producer to 
produce products" on the basis of the weight of the entire broiler less the weight of feathers, blood and 
viscera because, it stated, the latter were non-subject products. The Panel noted that there was no dispute 
between the parties that feathers, blood, and viscera are not "produced" for human consumption. At the 
same time, however, it considered uncontroversial that "feathers, blood, and viscera are essential parts 
of a live broiler, and thus they are intrinsic to the production of the subject broiler product models". The 
Panel also noted that the distinction between subject and non-subject products, in itself, had no bearing 
on the question of whether MOFCOM came to a reasoned conclusion in choosing a methodology to 
allocate costs to subject broiler product models.38 
The Panel noted that, to comply with its obligation to "consider all available evidence on the proper 
allocation of costs", MOFCOM was required, at a minimum, to explain why the concern it relied upon 
to choose a weight-based cost allocation methodology (i.e. that allocations must "reasonably reflect 
costs" of production) allowed for the exclusion of certain parts of a live broiler (feathers, blood, and 
viscera) that are necessarily part of the production of the subject broiler product models. MOFCOM 
failed to do so. For this reason, the Panel concluded that China did not act consistently with the second 
sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.39 
Before delving into the details of an economic analysis of cost allocation methodologies, it is useful 
to draw parallels between a general issue in this case and in previous ones. In Broiler Products, we are 
again confronted with a challenge to the methodology employed by one country (China) in applying its 
anti-dumping policy. In this case, the methodological approach taken by China – applying a weight-
based cost allocation to a multi-product firm whose production process created undesirable outputs with 
non-trivial disposal costs – bears a striking similarity to the approach taken by the US in the use of the 
“zeroing” methodology. In essence, both the weight-based cost allocation methodology and the zeroing 
methodology were economically-questionable methodologies which appear to have been intentionally 
designed to generate higher dumping margins than could otherwise be obtained.40 In a series of rulings, 
the AB struck down the use of the zeroing methodology by the US (see Prusa and Vermulst 2009, 
Crowley and Howse 2010). From an economics perspective, in the vast majority of cases, the zeroing 
methodology was at odds with basic economic principles and gave the appearance of being a rather 
convoluted effort to justify import duties that would provide relief from intense import competition that 
was adversely impacting a domestic import-competing industry. Ultimately, the real problem with 
zeroing was that it was inconsistent with the spirit of what the Anti-Dumping Agreement was trying to 
achieve – a fair assessment of unfair trading practices.  
The Broiler Products case with China is similar in two respects; (1) the methodology employed to 
assess dumping – cost allocation by weight for a multi-component product in which each component 
faces different demand and a different demand elasticity – is difficult to justify on economic grounds 
and (2) the aim of the policy seemed to be to provide relief from import competition (rather than to 
offset anti-competitive practices by foreign firms). In this light, we will first examine the question of 
why the Chinese methodology was inherently inappropriate before suggesting an alternative approach. 
                                                     
37 Panel Report, para. 7.51. 
38 Panel Report, paras. 7.53-7.54 and 7.56 (original underlining). 
39 Panel Report, paras. 7.58 and 7.59. 
40 To be precise, application of the methodologies to the respective cases at issue in disputes were difficult to justify on 
economic grounds, but one could imagine alternative scenarios, products and market structures to which they might be 
appropriate. See Crowley and Howse (2010).  
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We will then turn to the broader question of what should the Chinese have done in this situation if their 
real concern was reduced profitability and success of domestic import competing producers.  
3.2.1 The economic approach to cost allocation and productivity estimation  
Assessing the magnitude of price-cost markups for a firm and products within a firm is a long-standing 
exercise undertaken in academic economic research. Recently, the methodologies used to estimate costs 
and markups have become a hot topic for academic debate due to the concern that both market 
concentration and markups might be experiencing a long term secular increase (See the debate between 
de Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017 and Hall, 2018). To estimate markups for products within firms, there 
are two major difficulties for researchers or government officials: (a) the marginal cost is unobserved 
and depends on the use of variable inputs whose shares and prices change over time directly in response 
to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks (see e.g., Amiti, Itzhoki, and Konings, 2014) and indirectly, 
through general equilibrium effects of the prices of factors of production41; and (b) economic theory 
does not provide a unique rule for allocating common costs across multiple products within a multi-
product firm.  
Despite these challenges, economists routinely derive estimates of marginal costs by making 
reasonable assumptions such as the firm is a profit-maximizing entity. This approach requires detailed 
firm-level information. Using balance sheet data, leading contributions taking this approach for firms 
engaged in international trade include Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) and Amiti, Itzkhoki, and 
Konings (2014). While these papers have clearly broken new important ground in firm-level studies, 
they are not without problems.  
A key challenge in this literature is that even when an analyst obtains the complete balance sheet 
data for all relevant firms, information on production inputs is generally available only at the firm level-
--not at the firm-product level. Without some assumptions on how inputs are allocated across products, 
it is impossible to estimate marginal cost at the firm-product level. The seminal contribution by de 
Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2018) estimates firm-product level marginal costs and 
markups under the assumption that the production functions of single-product firms are representative 
of those of multi-product firms. In the case of Broiler Products, the challenge of estimating product-
level costs is much more difficult than that of the typical multi-product manufacturing firm. Because 
inputs like labour to care for chickens and feed to fatten chickens are common inputs used in the 
production of all outputs, including high value items such as chicken breast meat and waste products 
that involve disposal costs such as intestines or blood, the standard approach of applying the cost shares 
from single product firms to the different product lines in a multi-product firm is not available. This was 
the starting point from which MOFCOM had to begin their analysis.  
Conceptually, for a multi-product firm that has a purely common input technology, a unique cost 
allocation does not necessarily exist. However, a standard economics framework can place bounds on 
the range of cost allocations that should be admissible. Because economics relies upon the assumption 
that firms seek to maximize profit, the cost allocation problem is generally framed in terms of values 
(monetary) rather than in other metrics such as physical quantity or number of workers employed. For 
example, if we assume that a firm producing three outputs (e.g. high value chicken breast, low value 
chicken feet, and costly-to-dispose offal), has a production technology in which all common inputs 
produce outputs in fixed quantity ratios, and is profit-maximising, then we can obtain constraints on 
feasible cost allocations.  
Suppose the firm’s profit function were given by: 
                                                     
41 For example, a positive productivity shock in one country that lowers the marginal cost of production would also cause the 
country’s currency to appreciate against its trade partners and raise the cost of imported inputs and relative wage. See 
Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008) for a discussion. 
China – Broiler Products (Article 21.5 – United States) (DS427) – can the sum of the parts be less than the whole? 
European University Institute 11 
𝜋 = 𝑝𝑏 ∗ 𝑞𝑏 + 𝑝𝑓 ∗ 𝑞𝑓 − 𝑐𝑜 ∗ 𝑞𝑜 − 𝐶(𝑄) 
 
where 𝑝𝑏 , 𝑝𝑓 , and 𝑐𝑜represent the prices of breast meat, feet, and the disposal price of offal; 𝑞𝑏, 𝑞𝑓, and 
𝑞𝑜 represent the numbers of units of breast meat, feet and offal produced, and 𝐶(𝑄) is the cost of 
producing Q chickens. Further assume that the joint-output production function for chicken can be 
specified as a normalized Leontief production technology in which each chicken produces one 
(normalized) unit of breast meat, one (normalized) unit of feet and one (normalized) unit of offal. 
Under these assumptions, we can easily derive bounds on the admissible set of cost allocations. In 
this example, profit maximization requires that the sum of the firm’s marginal revenues over all products 
be greater than or equal to its marginal cost of producing chickens. Because the “price” of offal in this 
example is negative in this example, we can move it to the right hand side of the equation and express 
the profit-maximization condition in terms of one unit of chicken42:  
 
𝑝𝑏 + 𝑝𝑓 ≥ 𝑐𝑜 + 𝐶(1) 
This expression tells us that the key constraint that economic theory places on cost allocation is simply 
that the firm’s revenues must exceed its costs. If this condition does not hold, then the firm is not a 
rationale profit-maximizing entity. This is a simplified version of the general result that, for a set of 
products with fully integrated joint production, the constraint on firm pricing and cost is that the sum of 
marginal revenues (and costs, for disposal outputs) must be greater than or equal to the marginal cost of 
production.43 As stated here, it is not necessary to strictly allocate costs to different products proportional 
to the revenue they generate in order for a firm to be profit-maximizing. Generally, a value-based cost 
allocation can capture the idea that the integrated production process that generates high and low value 
outputs would very likely still take place even if low-value outputs cross an arbitrary line to become 
waste products that are costly to dispose.  
In this regard, the Panel was correct to draw attention to the fact that the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
is somewhat deferential to the exporter’s own record of costs. What is somewhat worrisome is the 
Panel’s suggestion that it should be relatively easy for an IA to reject exporters’ records and 
methodologies if the IA can provide a reason for the rejection. While one can imagine many scenarios 
in which the firm’s data is poor or incomplete and should be rejected on those grounds, economic theory 
suggests that considerable flexibility over the firm’s exact cost-allocation rule should be permitted. 
Economic theory does not require a unique approach – it is reasonable to allow firms some flexibility in 
how to manage their own accounting of costs.  
Despite this general desire to allow flexibility in firms’ treatment of their own cost allocation, the 
same should not necessarily be said of the methodology imposed by an IA. The issue that arises with 
the Chinese weight-based cost allocation is that it builds in an arbitrary requirement that every output of 
a firm (including pure waste products) must satisfy the requirement that price exceeds cost. This is 
clearly a nonsense assumption in the case of waste products and is entirely arbitrary in the case of low-
value by-products such as chicken feet. The arbitrary weight-based allocation is designed to show that 
firms choose to operate by-product lines at a long-term, persistent loss. Because the methodology is 
designed to deliver pricing below cost as an outcome, that is precisely what it delivers. Suppose that a 
chicken weighing 1 kg was comprised of 500 grams of breast meat, 100 grams of feet and 400 grams of 
offal, that the cost of producing this chicken was $1, and that the respective prices for the outputs were 
                                                     
42 The simple example assumes that firms are price-takers who cannot influence the price of their good and that unit cost does 
not change with the quantity produced. The more general expression of the profit maximization can be written 
∑ 𝑝𝑖
′(𝑞𝑖) = 𝐶′(𝑄)𝑖 , i.e., the firm’s profit maximizing quantity, Q, equates the sum of the marginal products of the multiple 
joint outputs to the marginal cost of producing Q units.  
43 This condition is an analogue of the well-known Samuelson condition on the optimal provision of public goods – the sum 
of marginal benefits in the population must be equal to the marginal cost of provision. 
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$3 for chicken breast, $0.10 for chicken feet, and the disposal cost of offal were $1. In this example, it 
is an exercise in nonsense to assign four-tenths of the cost of production to a waste product that requires 
costly disposal. Further, even if we follow a weight-based cost allocation that sets aside the weight of 
costly offal, the methodology would still apply five-sixths of the total unit cost of $2 to chicken breast 
and one-sixth to feet, implying that the chicken feet are running at a substantial loss. In contrast, the 
value-based profit-maximization condition presented above is clearly satisfied as $3.10>$2. 
Furthermore, although it is more restrictive than simply necessary, the revenue-proportional cost 
allocation rejected by MOFCOM would imply two profitable product lines. In this sense, the MOFCOM 
methodology has a striking resemblance to zeroing – it is a methodology with a pre-determined 
conclusion that always finds the foreign producer at fault. In taking a position that a weight-based 
approach to cost allocation is acceptable as long as it is applied properly, the Panel has allowed a 
methodology of dubious economic merit that, in many instances, will generate high dumping margins 
even when no dumping or anti-competitive behaviour is taking place. This conclusion should 
particularly annoy those Americans who were disappointed by previous rulings that restricted the use of 
zeroing.  
Stepping back, the larger question of why MOFCOM chose to analyse production costs of US 
producers is relevant. MOFCOM appears to have been concerned that the price of US chicken feet was 
below that of Chinese-produced chicken feet and this was reducing the profitability of Chinese 
producers. Although some US producers had limited US sales, the reality is that there is almost no 
demand for the product in the US so the price is essentially zero. In China, the price is positive. With 
the price in the export market above the price in the home market, there was no dumping taking place 
according to the Anti-Dumping Agreement’s first definition of dumping.  
This raises the question of what methodologies should the Anti-Dumping Agreement permit for 
assessing dumping. The answer from economists has long been that the criteria in the Agreement make 
little sense and trying to codify them is a futile exercise. The intention of the Agreement was supposed 
to be to prevent anti-competitive behaviour and the abuse of market power by foreign exporters. This is 
not being achieved with the current rules.  
One approach to evaluating a firm’s market power and the existence of the pricing-to-market 
behaviour is found in Corsetti, Crowley, Han, and Song (2019). These authors propose a new way to 
evaluate pricing-to-market and market power for the multi-product, multi-destination exporters that 
dominate global trade. This method relies exclusively on customs data including prices and quantities 
of exports at the level of products within firms and, notably, does not require the more detailed and 
difficult-to-obtain balance sheet data of individual firms. Corsetti, Crowley, Han and Song (2019) 
develop a two-part framework consisting of a Trade Pattern Sequential Fixed Effects (TPSFE) estimator 
and a product classification system to estimate the destination-specific markup elasticity to the exchange 
rate. This methodology allows researchers to identify pricing-to-market and market power by firms by 
precisely isolating cross-market variation in prices, obtained after removing time-varying factors 
including marginal production costs, at the level of each individual product.44  
The main takeaways from their empirical analysis are that pricing-to-market is routinely practiced 
by exporters, it is more pervasive in final consumer goods and more differentiated goods, it is more 
frequently used by larger firms than by smaller firms, and it can be observed to differing degrees in the 
vast majority of products exported from China. A similar analysis of UK exports by Corsetti, Crowley, 
and Han (2018) finds extensive pricing-to-market by UK firms that are invoicing their exports in the 
local currency of the foreign country to which the goods are headed. These findings confirm what 
                                                     
44 The general approach builds on the seminal work by Knetter (1989) which first proposed to net out changes in unobservable 
marginal costs by using cross-market differences in prices. Because the markets in which firms operate each period can 
and does vary endogenously with unobservable changes in production costs and demand which are arguably correlated 
with changes in bilateral exchange rates, controlling for the time-varying set of destination markets---that is, a firm’s trade 
pattern for each product---is essential to ensure that the estimated elasticity is identified. 
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economists critical of the Agreement on Anti-Dumping have long argued; the Agreement’s codification 
of price-discrimination across markets as an unfair trading practice is sanctioning a common, profit-
maximizing pricing strategy. While pricing-to-market might be coincident with anti-competitive 
practices, it does not, by itself, provide any useful information about whether exporters are engaging in 
unfair trade.  
3.2.2 Broader economics questions relevant to Broiler Products  
Taking a broader look at the normative problems relevant to this case, two things stand out. First, there 
seems to have been little evidence of pricing below cost by the US exporters, yet the Chinese pursued 
an antidumping rather than a safeguards case.45 The safeguards agreement was intended to provide 
policy flexibility from fair foreign competition. The fact that countries do not view a safeguard measure 
as a viable approach to providing import relief is driven by multiple factors. Firstly, the political 
economy of having to admit that one’s own industry is behind the times is more difficult to manage than 
accusing foreigners of unfair practices. Second, the three-year duration of retaliation-free protection is 
short compared to five years under anti-dumping. Third, anti-dumping is a bilateral policy which 
potentially creates less international commercial tension than a non-discriminatory safeguard. Other 
factors are likely relevant. But we cannot understate the damage caused by the Appellate Body’s 
decision in Argentina-Footwear to revive and raise the standard on an “unforeseen developments” test. 
Since that ruling, there has been little use of safeguards. Furthermore, efforts by WTO bodies to curb 
protectionism by tightening up the criteria to assess dumping margins in antidumping cases appear to 
vacillate between being overly restrictive in some cases (e.g., US-Mexico Steel as argued by Crowley 
and Howse, 2010) and too deferential to domestic authorities in others (e.g. US-China Broiler Products, 
as noted above).  
In retrospect, the gradual shrinking of trade policy space through rulings restricting the use of 
safeguards and antidumping might have been gone too far. Given extensive use of extra-WTO measures 
to restrict imports by the US over the last two years, in hindsight, the well-intentioned efforts by WTO 
bodies to clarify the rules of the WTO agreements might have overshot their mark. If anything, limited 
use of temporary trade barriers now seems to have been one of the factors that kept the WTO functioning 
well in its first decade and beyond. A series of papers by Bown and Crowley (2013a, 2013b, and 2014) 
document that countries apply temporary trade barriers, especially anti-dumping duties, to cope with 
real economic shocks that are largely outside the control of domestic producers. Going forward, there is 
a need to re-evaluate how safeguards and antidumping policy should be optimally designed to help 
countries manage economic shocks.46 A redesign would allow countries to reset the balance between 
policy flexibility and trade liberalism.  
The last normative issue relevant to this case is the time lapse between the initial filing of the dispute 
in 2013 and the issuance of a compliance Panel report in 2018. The lack of any punitive damages during 
the long period in which any WTO case is being heard, appealed, and re-evaluated provides a strong 
incentive to all countries to “test” WTO rules with policies that give every appearance of being 
inconsistent with the Agreement from their initial introduction, but that grant considerable policy 
flexibility at no cost. It is not entirely clear what the best practice should be – introducing damages 
would provide a stronger incentive for countries to stick to the rules, but in the current environment of 
trade tensions, introducing damages might simply pour fuel on the populist, anti-globalization fire. At 
this point, it is worth stressing that the lack of any provision for redress creates an incentive to deviate 
                                                     
45 As noted earlier, because China’s investigation began immediately after the US tire safeguards case, China’s primary 
motivation may have been retaliation, rather than stabilizing its domestic industry. However, if its objective had been to 
stabilize output and market share of its domestic industry, then a safeguard should have been a viable policy option.  
46 A small caveat is that it is not obvious if the ideal safeguards policy would be bilateral or non-discriminatory. The papers 
by Bown and Crowley (2013a, 2013b, and 2014) find that countries use antidumping to respond to bilateral shocks. An 
ideally-designed safeguard would take into account whether the underlying shock  
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from WTO rules persistently and future reform efforts should think seriously about how to better 
incentivize compliance.  
4. Conclusions 
As in the original China – Broiler Products dispute, China lost on almost all the claims brought by the 
United States at the compliance stage. Notably, China failed again to properly allocate costs when 
constructing the normal value of broiler products in the US market. However, its failure to comply with 
this obligation was not due to the fact that it used a weight-based cost allocation methodology – which 
the authors consider economically-questionable – as opposed to the value-based cost allocation 
methodology suggested by the US exporters. It was due to China's inability to apply its own 
methodology in a coherent and consistent manner. From a legal precedent perspective, however, it is 
somewhat worrisome what the Panel implicitly suggested: that it should be relatively easy for an 
investigating authority to find a reason to reject exporters' cost-allocation methodologies and to replace 
them with alternative methodologies better-designed to deliver dumping as an outcome. 
China did succeed in showing compliance with two obligations: the obligation to disclose essential 
facts and the obligation concerning "residual" rates for unknown exporters. Although the Panel properly 
relied on previous jurisprudence to rule on those claims, the authors consider that there is room for 
debate as to the appropriateness of the current legal standards for all cases. The Panel followed previous 
precedent when noting that only data and formulae, but not the margin calculations themselves, 
constitute "essential facts" that must be disclosed by an investigating authority. The authors wonder 
whether this interpretation should be more flexible, particularly in cases where a general lack of 
regulatory transparency can be shown. The Panel also followed previous caselaw when finding that the 
Antidumping Agreement does not address the situation in which certain companies do not make 
themselves known to the investigating authority, and that China could therefore attribute a higher 
"residual" margin of dumping to those unknown exporters. The authors wonder, however, whether the 
notion of "unknown" exporters should be revisited at the compliance stage, considering that potential 
new exporters could have appeared in the market and be willing to participate in the reinvestigation. 
In any event, the China – Broiler Products dispute was presumably political in nature. The imposition 
of duties on US broiler products appears to have been a retaliatory response to the tariff increase on 
Chinese tires, rather than the result of a genuine trade remedy investigation based on strong underlying 
dumping and subsidization evidence. This could explain why China's behaviour did not change 
significantly after the first adverse WTO ruling in 2013. The United States had to bring a compliance 
proceeding to try to secure China's compliance, and eventually succeeded. In February 2018 – a month 
after the circulation of the compliance panel report – China announced the removal of the antidumping 
and countervailing duties on US broiler products. This is not the first time, however, that the United 
States has been forced to bring a compliance proceeding against China on trade remedies. In China – 
Grain-Oriented Electrical Steel (GOES), the United States achieved effective victory – i.e. the removal 
of antidumping and countervailing duties – only after five years of WTO litigation. Regardless, China's 
compliance in the Broiler dispute is good news for the United States. This notwithstanding, the removal 
of duties came against a backdrop of an escalating trade tension between China and the United States. 
In January 2018, Washington increased tariffs on solar panels – mostly coming from China – and 
washing machines, which triggered an antidumping investigation by Beijing on US sorghum. At a 
general level, it is somewhat worrisome that WTO Members may use trade remedy investigations as a 
retaliatory mechanism rather than as a tool to seek legitimate relief from challengeable dumping and 
subsidization practices.  
***** 
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